Rice Sector Policy Options in Guinea bissau by Kyle, Steven
WP 2015-01 
January 2015 
 
 
Working Paper 
 
Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management 
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York  14853-7801  USA 
 
 
 
Rice Sector Policy Options in Guinea bissau 
 
Steven Kyle 
 
  
It is the Policy of Cornell University actively to support equality of 
educational and employment opportunity.  No person shall be denied 
admission to any educational program or activity or be denied employment 
on the basis of any legally prohibited discrimination involving, but not limited 
to, such factors as race, color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, 
age or handicap.  The University is committed to the maintenance of 
affirmative action programs which will assure the continuation of such 
equality of opportunity. 
ABSTRACT 
Rice Sector Policy Options in Guinea Bissau 
Steven Kyle 
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Rice in Guinea Bissau occupies a very important place in the agricultural and national economy 
of the country.  Traditionally the main staple grain in this estuarine country, it has in recent 
decades become the largest food import.  Government policy toward the rice sector is 
complicated by its relationship to cashew cultivation – while not serious competitors in terms of 
land, the majority of households grow at least some cashew which is bartered for rice at a rate of 
exchange which de facto sets the relative prices between the two crops.  This paper discusses the 
relative merits of alternative policies to promote growth in rice production in  light of these 
considerations. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
A.  Current Situation in Guinea Bissau 
 
 Guinea Bissau is a low lying estuarine country which is very suitable for all types of rice 
cultivation.  in coastal areas, the numerous river estuaries and their tides (up to 7 m) play an 
important role providing major channels for transport and irrigation. In the interior, the fresh 
watercourses diminish substantially during the dry season.  Groundwater sources are abundant 
and of variable qualities.  
 Three main agro-ecological zones can be distinguished – the Eastern, Northern and 
Southern. The Eastern agro-ecological zone is characterized by a Sudan climate with two distinct 
seasons – a dry season between November and May and the rainy season from June to October. 
Average annual rainfall varies between 1200-1500mm in 107 rainy days. Average annual evapo-
transpiration is 2,507mm.  The annual average temperature is 27.4ºC with relative humidity of 
26%. Because of the irregularity of precipitation this zone has the lowest potential for rainfed 
upland rice but there is great potential for irrigated rice with an estimated potential of more than 
25.000ha of irrigable lowland in the Geba River valley alone. 
 The Southern agro-ecological zone comprises the regions of Tombali, Quinara and 
Bolama/Bijagos and is characterized by a humid subtropical climate. Average precipitation is 
2,000-2,500mm in 125 rainy days with 70% of the precipitation in July, August and September. 
Annual average temperature is 26.9ºC with relative humidity of 70% and annual evaporate-
transpiration of 1,458mm. This is the agro-ecological zone with the greatest agricultural potential 
in Guinea-Bissau particularly for mangrove swamp rice. It contains Cumbidja River valley 
which is considered the main mangrove swamp rice-growing area with an estimated potential of 
22,000 ha. 
 The Northern agro-ecological zone (Oio, Cacheu, Biombo) is characterized by a Guinean 
maritime climate. Average annual precipitation varies from 1500-1877mm in 122 rainy days 
with annual evaporate-transpiration of 1,837mm. Average annual temperature is 26.6ºC. The 
zone has good agricultural potential for mangrove as well as lowland rice production. The 
Mansoa River valley represents the main rice-growing potential, estimated at 19,000 ha.  (See 
                                                          
1
 Funding for this paper was received from the World Bank.  All errors/omission or opinions are solely due to the 
author. 
3 
 
Spencer and Djata 2008 for a detailed description of hydrology and suitability for rice 
cultivation) 
 
B.  Cashews, Rice and Vulnerability to Crises 
 
 The experience of the past several years has demonstrated several basic facts about 
Guinea Bissau’s rural economy: 
 
1.  The farmgate price of cashew is and will remain the single most important determinant of 
incomes in rural areas.  Most rural households are net sellers of at least a small amount of 
cashew and changes in this price translate directly into changes in income for many (indeed 
most) of the poorest in rural areas.  What data is available strongly supports this point.  In a 2013 
survey of Guinea Bissau, the World Food Program found that 80% of households benefits from 
cashew sales.  No other single commodity or policy has anywhere near the broad impact that 
cashew prices do. 
 
2. This salient role of the cashew price is a two edged sword – While it provides a readily usable  
lever through which policy can strongly affect rural incomes and welfare, it also is a source of 
vulnerability.  Indeed, fluctuations of the cashew price generate more uncertainty and risk than 
almost any other source.  Cashew price declines can drop many below poverty levels of income 
and indeed have done just that in recent years. 
 
3. Fluctuations and risk due to cashew price changes need not come only from world markets.  
Government policy can just easily cause problems, especially when stop-go policies make it 
difficult to rely on any particular price even within a single growing season. 
 
4.  Rice remains the single most important grain crop in the country.  It is widely grown though 
most growers do not sell a significant amount into the market.  It is also widely used by cashew 
traders to barter for raw cashew supplies, though these supplies are almost exclusively supplied 
via imports.  Imports also are sold in some urban areas. 
 
5.  One implication of Point 4 above is that rice presents some difficulties for policy that 
complicate potential initiatives in the sector.  It is at once an important agricultural output as well 
as a major item in most Guineans’ consumption basket, which means that price changes are good 
for some and bad for others.  It is also at the same time a major import and a major potential 
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export crop (in the longer term).  Again, there are winners and losers from various potential 
policy initiatives. 
 
C.  Political Situation and Problems with Governance 
 
 The political economy of Guinea  Bissau when coupled with the extremely poor 
governance that has become a standard fact of life in this country mean that there can be no 
expectation that the policy levers available to the government (e.g. cashew policy) will be used 
with any long run optimal view in mind.  Rather, short run rent seeking is a far more likely 
outcome, as demonstrated by the experience of FUNPI, a mechanism designed to promote 
cashew processing development through levies on exports of raw cashew.  While clearly 
defensible from an economic point of view, this mechanism is just as clearly capable of abuse, 
with accumulated funds diverted from their intended developmental targets.  Worse still, 
politically inspired changes in the terms of the levy have gone far toward destroying any 
semblance of stability in the cashew market. 
 
D.  The Question to be Adressed by this Paper 
 
 All of these considerations together with the recent experience with FUNPI in Guinea 
Bissau have given cause for a search for ways to diversify rural incomes so as to reduce 
vulnerability to policy induced (or indeed market induced) gyrations in rural cashew prices.  In 
particular, attention has been drawn to the traditional staple grain of Guinea Bissau – rice.  Given 
that crises in rural incomes, whether they originate in cashew policy or elsewhere – manifest 
themselves in widespread hunger and malnutrition, it is perhaps natural to ask whether 
interventions in the most important food crop can in some way alleviate the problem.  The 
question to be addressed can be stated as follows: 
 
Given extreme vulnerability to cashew price level and fluctuation, can rice 
policy do anything to alleviate this, especially for the most vulnerable  
third of the population? 
 
 The question is perhaps more obvious to close observers of Guinea Bissau than might be 
apparent at first glance.  This is due to the fact that the rice and cashew markets have been 
closely linked over the past several decades due to the mechanism through which cashew 
exporters acquire raw cashew for export.  In essence, they have instituted a barter system in 
which cashew is traded directly for rice which is provided by cashew exporters.  In many cases 
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this results in an entirely non-monetized transaction in which the price of cashew is implied in 
the terms of trade offered for the barter for rice.  Indeed most of the rice imported into the 
country is used in exactly this way.  This means that the cashew trade not only has a direct link 
to the farmgate price of cashew – it has a direct link to the rural price of rice as well. 
 The answer to the above question will be analyzed in two parts – interventions that can 
have an effect in the short run and those which can have an effect in the long run.  Obviously, 
there are different constraints and possibilities depending on the time frame chosen, with equally 
obvious implications for what is really possible if the goal is to alleviate crises of hunger and 
poverty in the short run vs. the more developmental question of long run growth. 
 Short run policy must take the current economic structure, (i.e. farm level land tenure, 
productivity and related indicators), the marketing system,  and infrastructure as given.   Long 
run policy should be based on comparative advantage and looks at how GB’s long run 
investment plan can best exploit this in a way to benefit the largest number of people possible.  It 
is worth making clear at the outset that Guinea Bissau’s current situation means that the ability of 
policy to make a significant offset to adverse developments in the cashew sector is limited in the 
short run.  The extremely poor infrastructure coupled with lack of technological progress at the 
farm level mean that only a limited response to price incentives can be expected.   But existing 
measures of comparative advantage show that the long run potential in rice is very attractive and 
should be exploited if possible. 
 The next section of this paper provides an overview of the current situation in Guinea 
Bissau in terms of rice cultivation and consumption.  A brief history of rice cultivation is 
followed by a discussion of the main production systems for rice after which trends in 
consumption, imports and marketing are examined.  The next section analyzes how rice prices 
are set in Guinea Bissau, together with a review of the policy options for affecting these prices.  
This is followed by a section looking at the long run potential for rice in the country and the 
obstacles to exploiting the comparative advantage that the country clearly possesses.  Finally, the 
paper concludes with a section discussing what interventions are possible in the short run (i.e the 
next 2-3 years) and what results can reasonably be expected. 
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II. Rice in Guinea Bissau 
 
 A.  History of rice cultivation 
 
 Rice cultivation in Guinea Bissau started with mangrove rice cultivation in the Mansoa 
River valley in the Northern agro-ecological zone in the pre-colonial period over 500 years ago 
when there was abundant rain and high soil fertility. The traditional Balanta farmers claimed 
fields from the sea, desalinated them by constructing dykes around them, allowing leaching by 
rain water before cultivating rice. Rice production was for domestic use with rice often battered 
for other commodities and imported items.  
 
 The colonial war of pacification in 1915 worsened the rice-growing situation as whole 
villages were burnt, flocks were slaughtered and the maintenance of rice-growing systems was 
compromised. Forced labor that followed the pacification wars aggravated the rice-growing 
crisis in the North. Labor was relocated to construction of buildings and houses for the colonial 
civil servants as well as bridges and roads.  Because of the repressive conditions imposed by the 
Colonial regime in the North there was massive migration of peoples of the “mother country” to 
new areas in the south, in the area of Catio, Tombali Region where the immigrants established 
rice growing systems where the agro-ecological conditions were suitable. In these systems rice 
was produced for commercial purposes in addition to subsistence production. As a result national 
rice production rose between 1930 and 1960 and the country exported small quantities with a 
peak between 1940 and 1955. Average annual production was estimated at 45,000 tons of paddy 
or 30,000 tons of clean white rice, out of which 7,000 tons of white rice were exported. 
 During the national liberation war (1955-1960) and the civil war that followed (1963 – 
1973) rice production again declined as there was social disturbances, terror and fright. Rice 
fields were bombed by the Portuguese military destroying hydraulic infrastructures (bridges and 
anti-salt dykes) in order to cut off food supplies to the liberated zones. Also the relationships of 
authority between the old and youths, one of the pillars on which rice-growing sustained itself 
was eroded with consequent migration of mangrove rice cultivators ending in total abandonment 
of many mangrove swamp rice perimeters. Urban centers under the control of the colonialists 
had to import rice and in the liberated zones controlled by PAIGC, the producers were forced to 
develop subsistence rice cultivation on the much less productive uplands (Mpam-pam). 
 The period immediately after the National Liberation war (1973-1987) was characterized 
by a program to re-launch agricultural production. One of the main pillars in the attempt to reach 
food self-sufficiency was to expand the area of mangrove swamp rice cultivation by the 
rehabilitation of sea dykes, construction of sluice gates and mangrove swamp rice perimeters. 
Thirty-nine dykes and sluices were constructed during the period with nine more after 1988 
totaling 48 anti-salt sluices protecting more than 100.000 ha with an average investment per 
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sluice estimated by FAO at around US$40,000. However, it is estimated that rehabilitated areas 
served by 23 of the sluice gates were not cultivated which corresponds to 50% of the area of 
abandoned mangrove swamp cultivation in the country.  Lowland rice cultivation in small 
valleys was also encouraged in the in the East with women predominating in the activity and an 
estimated 29.400 ha being put under cultivation by 1995. Upland rice cultivation was actively 
discouraged by the Government.  
 Table 1 shows the current situation in terms of food production in Guinea Bissau.  As can 
be seen, rice is the dominant staple grain – Note that the difference between net and gross 
production includes not only losses but also the need to hold back seed for the following crop 
season. 
 
Table 1. Average and recent net crop production 
Crops 
Average 
5 yrs * 
Campaign 
2012/2013 
Net Production 2012/2013 
Tons Tons Tons (% difference from gross)** 
Rice Plateau 49,735 53,915   
Rice valley and Bolanha 68,808 97,083   
Rice mangrove 48,292 43,506   
Rice (produced in Bissau) 3,760 4,000   
Total Rice 170,595 198,504 119,102 -40% 
Corn 8,339 7,195   
Sorghum 17,066 23,547   
Millet 18,055 16,954   
Fonio 478 580   
Dry cereals (produced in Bissau) 1,474 2,000   
Total Dry cereals 45,412 50,276 42,735 -15% 
Total Rice and Cereals 216,007 248,781 161 ,837 -35% 
Cassava 44,197 20,755 15,774 -24% 
Sweet Potato 18,253 13,340 11,459 -14.1 
Peanut 34,695 45,214 45,214 0 
Bean Mancanha 1,531 565 565 0 
* 5 years average (2007-2011) 
** The difference between gross and net production is due to either lost production or seed retention  
     Source: Harvest Evaluation Mission 2012/2013, GoGB/CILSS/WFP/FAO, 2013, 
 
B.  Rice production systems in Guinea Bissau 
 
 Rice is the main staple food for Guinea-Bissau, accounting for 37% of the value of food 
consumption and about 40% of daily calorific intake of the average household. According to the 
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International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), Guinea Bissau’s rice consumption per person per 
year was estimated at 87.3 kg in 1999. With a population currently estimated at 1.6 million and, 
using current rice consumption rates per person per year, the country requires 139,680 tons of  
milled rice annually equivalent to about 235,000 tons of paddy to reach national rice self 
sufficiency.  
 Table 2 shows the evolution of domestic rice production in Guinea Bissau in recent 
decades indicating that production peaked in the second half of the 1990s before the recent civil 
war and only recovered in 2007, rising to about 200,000 MT/year in the most recent years. 
 In Guinea-Bissau, rice is currently produced in three ecosystems – rainfed uplands, 
lowlands (rainfed and irrigated) and mangrove.  The descriptions below are taken from Spencer 
and Djata (2008).  Table 3 shows the yields achieved in each of these systems. 
 
 
Table 2: Area Harvested, Yield and Average 
Annual Production of Rice (paddy) in Guinea Bissau 
Year Area  Yield Production  
 Ha Kg/ha Metric Tons 
1961/65 66,200 741 48,400 
1966/70 34,000 1,187 40,100 
1971/75 44,400 859 37,800 
1976/80 70,000 734 52,400 
1081/85 102,600 1,024 95,630 
1986/90 53,707 2,037 109,370 
1991/95 65,084 1,959 127,413 
1996/2000 65,613 1,512 98,746 
2001/05 66,384 1,354 89,767 
2006 65,000 1,631 106,000 
2007 70,087 1,816 127,250 
2008 82,197 1,810 148,757 
2009 89,305 2,037 181,894 
2010 100,510 2,082 209,240 
2011 106.300 1,648 175,213 
2012 107,000 1,855 198,504 
Source: FAOStats 
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Upland rice 
The traditional slash and burn system of upland rice production is practiced in all agro-ecological 
zones.  The usual practice is multiple cropping of rice, maize, grains, leguminous cultures, fruits 
and roots, etc. After one year of cultivation the land is either planted to cashew or left fallow for 
5 – 15 years depending on population density and availability of arable land in the community. 
The system has a negative impact on the environment causing loss of vegetation cover and 
biological diversity. It is estimated that there are less than 40,000 upland rice farms cultivated 
annually in Guinea Bissau covering about 26,000 ha with yields of 400 – 600 Kg per ha, and 
normally producing about 10% of national paddy production ( 46% in 2008) with no purchased 
inputs used by farmers. 
 
 
Lowland rice 
 
 Although found in all agro-ecological zones, the lowland or inland valley rice production 
system predominates in the Eastern agro-ecological zone. Rice is grown in depressions which 
have hydromorphic conditions during part of the year. It is estimated that there are more than 
200,000 ha potential suitable for rainfed and irrigated lowland rice production, out of which 
about 27,000 ha are cultivated under rainfed conditions by small farmers with yields ranging 
between 800 to 1,200 kg/ha.  
 
 Some of the lowlands and river terraces in the East particularly of the Geba River have 
been developed further into irrigated perimeters usually with Government or foreign donor 
funding and divided into 0.25 ha plots which are leased to farmers on a long term basis. 
Irrigation is almost exclusively by motor pump and improved varieties and purchased inputs are 
used. Land preparation is often by tractors. Presently irrigated production centers are in Bafata 
(154 ha), Carantaba (35 ha) and  Contubuel (135.5 ha). With proper management two crops are 
taken a year with yields ranging from 3-5 tons in each crop season and up to 7 tons/ha in the dry 
season.   This production system has accounted for about one third of total production in recent 
years. 
 
  
Mangrove Swamp Rice 
 This is the most extensive system of rice cultivation in Guinea Bissau and is widely 
practiced in coastal regions. Rice paddies are established by building anti-salt dykes along the 
banks and parallel to the estuaries with sluice gates. These anti-salt dykes prevent salt water 
intrusion into the rice fields and retain fresh water from rain necessary for the process of rice 
growth. Dykes are usually constructed by manual labor. Mechanical construction has also taken 
place using a service provided in the past by the Government but is currently unavailable.  
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It is estimated that there are more than 106,000 ha potentially suitable for mangrove rice 
production, out of which 50.000 ha have been reclaimed and are partially managed by the 
farmers. However only 16,564 ha are estimated to be cultivated in 2007 due to poor rainfall 
conditions with yields of 1,800 to 2,600 kg/ha. Fields are puddled and rice transplanted. No 
mineral fertilizers are applied. Mangrove swamp rice has historically provided the bulk of 
production in the country (80% according to Spencer and Djata 2008) but due to lack of repair 
and maintenance of infrastructure, especially following the civil war in the late 1990’s, now 
accounts for less than 25%. 
 
 
Table 3: Average Rice Yields in Guinea Bissau 
Rice crop type Yi.eld Range 
(bad year – good year) 
Mean yield 
Tons/ha Tons/ha 
Mangrove – N 1.8-2.6 2.2 
Mangrove – S 1.8-2.6 2.2 
Irrigated - rainfed 3.0-4.0 3.5 
Irrigated - Pump 5.0-6.0 5.5 
Lowland 0.8-1.2 1.0 
Upland 0.4-0.6 0.5 
           Source: National Statistics Service 
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III. Marketing and Pricing Rice in Guinea Bissau 
 
A. How does the price get set in this small open economy? 
 
 As noted in the introduction, there is substantial domestic production most of which is 
consumed by the producers themselves.  However, some of this output does reach local markets, 
though not enough to supply national needs.  Imports make up the rest of domestic availability 
with about two thirds of imports bartered directly for raw cashew and a third sold into mainly 
urban domestic markets.  Details of marketing channels for domestic and imported rice are 
detailed in this section.  Table 4 shows the overall production/import/consumption balance for 
the principal crops.  Figures 1 and 2 show marketing channels for domestic and imported rice. 
 
Table 4 Total food surplus/deficit projected for 2012/13 
Forecasts 2012/2013 
Rice Blé Millet/sorghum 
corn/other 
Total 
Tons Tons Tons Tons 
Domestic availability 122,602 656 4,3363 166,621 
       Gross production  198,504 
 
50,276 248,780 
       Net production  119,102 
 
42,735 161,837 
       Initial Stocks  3,500 656 628 4,784 
Needs 229,508 15,864 64,023 30,9395 
Gross surplus/deficit  -106,905 -15,208 -20,660 -142,774 
Balance of imports and exports 101,291 9,203 5,131 115,625 
        Foreseen imports  100,055 9,203 
 
109,258 
        Foreseen aid 1,236 0 5,131 6,367 
        Foreseen exports  … … … … 
Total surplus/deficit -5,614 -6,005 -15,529 -27,149 
Source: Harvest Evaluation Mission 2012/2013, GoGB/CILSS/ PAM/FAO, 2013 
 
 
Marketing Channels for Locally Produced Rice 
 
 It estimated that the majority of rural households engage in rice production.  Of these, 
less than a third market any of their production.  (See Table 5)    Essentially, this local rice 
economy functions much as it has for centuries:  Rice is produced through mainly traditional  
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Table 5: Percent of Farmers Reporting Sales of Domestic Rice in 2007 
Rice Production System Percent Farmers 
Making Sale 
Mangrove Swamp – North 13 
Mangrove Swamp – South 36 
Irrigated – Rainfed 0 
Irrigated – Pumping 31 
Upland 20 
Lowland 8 
Source: Field survey from Spencer and Djata 2008 
 
 
 
  PRODUCERS 
(Paddy) 
Hand Pounding 
Milled Rice 
Itinerant Merchants 
Urban Consumers Rural Consumers 
Figure 1: Marketing Channels for Domestic Rice in Guinea Bissau 
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methods with little or no purchased inputs, and is eaten by those who grow it.  However, some 
small amounts are often sold, usually in provincial market towns.  It is reported that some of this 
output finds its way to the city of Bissau, but amounts are very small. 
 There are very few traders engaged in rice trade apart from those who use it to barter for 
cashew.  Much of what output is marketed is brought to market by farmers themselves, who 
rarely travel very far from their homes.  This lack of an effective marketing system is the single 
most important characteristic of the market for locally produced rice.  It is worth emphasizing 
this point: 
 
- For the two thirds of rice producers who sell no output off-farm, urban rice prices are 
irrelevant, at least in the short run.  They each exist in economic isolation from the rest of the 
country and cannot respond to production incentives because they never SEE these incentives. 
 
 
B.  Marketing Channels for Imported Rice 
 
 Rice imports into Guinea Bissau is controlled and licensed by the government.  As of 
2008, four Government licensed merchant houses (Gomes and Gomes, Cogequi, Socobis and 
Agencia Bijagos) sourced most of their supplies from China, Vietnam and Thailand.   According 
to Spencer and Djata (2008) it is estimated that 50% - 70% of imported rice is used in barter 
trade for cashew which is a non-monetized exchange of one product for another.    As discussed 
below, pan-territorial prices for imported rice are set by the government based on CIF prices and 
assorted markups.   
 More recent information (Pereira personal communication 4-2-14) lists 10 licensed 
traders:   
  
1 - GOMES & GOMES 
2 - BÁ IRMÃOS 
3 - SOCOBIS 
4 - ETG-BISSAU 
5 - ADJ IRMÃOS 
6 - SANTY COMERCIAL 
7 -  CHETA - GUINÉ 
8 - CAR SILVA 
9 -  GETA BISSAU 
10 - MARIAMA TUNKARA 
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 There is no reliable estimate of the number of rice retailers/traders around the country.  
Anecdotal information indicates that the majority of them are foreign nationals (e.g. 
Mauritanians, Guineans) but this could not be verified.  Also impossible to verify is the extent to 
which these traders may represent a substantial change from the information revealed in the 2008 
field survey performed by Spencer & Djata.   Given the fact that this information is in no way 
inconsistent with the picture painted by that survey (i.e. that there are a number of rice importers 
who both sell in urban areas and also barter for cashew) and there is no evidence that any large 
change has occurred, there is no reason to suppose the market structure has changed to any great 
degree.  Indeed, the WFP rapid survey of 2013 reports on barter terms of trade and is entirely 
consistent with this view.
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 The retail price of rice is set by the Government in consultation with the importers, and is 
the same throughout the country. In negotiating the retail price importers arrive at a cost per bag 
ex-warehouse in Bissau by adding a markup on the CIF cost per bag. From information supplied 
by one of the importers this totaled about 18% of the CIF value in the first quarter of 2008, made 
up of customs duty (12.5% in 2007, reduced to 2.5% in March 2008 to cushion the effect of 
global rice price increases on consumers), port charges (CFA 2800/ton), cost of Letters of Credit 
and suppliers fees (5%), transfer fee (1.25%), stevedoring (CFA 110 per bag), transport from the 
port to importer’s warehouse (CFA 100 per bag), administrative costs (3%), SGS import 
inspection fee (1.7%), transportation to retailers (1%), and shortage (1%)   
 The importers usually transport milled rice from their warehouses to those of their retail 
customers located in most urban areas of the country in their own fleet of trucks at no additional 
cost to the retailers. This situation is acceptable by the importers as they are all exporters of 
cashew and the trucks usually return to Bissau loaded with cashew. 
 It is important to note that though the price is based on the world price of rice in 
international markets, the government has some scope for affecting the price by reducing import 
duties or other fees associated with the imports.  Though there is no evidence that it has ever 
actually happened, the government could in theory mandate prices even lower than the CIF price 
so long as the barter terms of trade resulted in an adequate net profit for the import licensees.  
Two unavoidable side effects should be emphasized which would limit the effectiveness of such 
a policy: 
- For the 30-40% of rice imports that are sold directly into urban or provincial markets, a reduced 
price would translate directly into lower retail prices.  The analytics of a tariff reduction are so 
well known as not to require exposition here, but suffice it to say that a reduced tariff (or other 
                                                          
2
 The World Food Program’s rapid rural survey of 2012-2103 was conducted after the disruptions of the April 2012 
coup d’etat and was based on surveys in the provinces of OIo, Biombo and Quinara.  Information was based on 
quantitative data collection at the household level, key informant interviews at the community level and secondary 
sources for national level data.  See WFP 2013 for a full description as well as a copy of the survey instrument 
used. 
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fee or levy which amounts to the same thing) would result in a lower retail price conditioned by 
the elasticity of demand for rice.  Consumers would clearly gain insofar as they have access to 
these market outlets while producers would suffer insofar as they produce (or could produce) for 
these same markets.  The government would lose revenue, which would limit the sustainability 
of the policy. 
-  The effects on the rice/cashew barter system is a bit more complicated.  To the extent that rice 
prices are lower, what this means to the barter terms of trade is that more rice is exchanged for a 
given amount of cashews.  While this would clearly be a good thing for farmers who engage in  
rice/cashew barter, it would amount to a tax on the cashew trade if the government forced the 
rice/cashew traders to absorb the price drop, reducing the profit margin on the entire transaction.   
 Given that world cashew prices are set by world market conditions, the higher the price 
paid to farmers, the less the margin  is between that price and world prices.  Those licensees 
engaged in the rice/cashew barter would then want very much to recoup these losses somewhere 
else in the process or else face reduced incentives overall to engage in the trade.  To put it in 
simple terms, for the 60-70% of imported rice that is used in the cashew barter trade, a change in 
the rice price is the same thing as a change in the barter terms of trade and ends up affecting the 
whole in much the same manner as a cashew levy or tax on another stage of the process, or 
simply a higher price.   Of course, if the government itself absorbs the price decrease via 
decreased fees or taxes, rice/cashew traders would see what amounts to a subsidy, increasing 
their demand for raw nuts. 
 The 2013 crop year is demonstrates that there is no “free lunch” when it comes to the 
rice/cashew price ratio on international markets and the barter terms of trade at the farm level.  In 
this year (See Figure 3) the barter terms of trade for farmers deteriorated from 1kg of raw cashew 
exchanged for 1kg of rice (i.e. 1:1) to a level of 1:3.  Not only is this experience key in 
understanding the motivation for the current desire for lower rice prices, but the result of it is 
also important.  The WFP (See WFP 2013) reported that more than a third of the cashew crop 
remained unsold at this price late in the season and that traders had stopped operations due to 
lower international prices and demand even at these more favorable terms of trade. 
 
The lessons are clear:   
1.  International prices DO affect internal prices in rural Guinea Bissau 
2. Both farmers and cashew traders are responsive to incentives 
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 It is important to emphasize that the two points above relate to the expected impact of 
changes in border taxes or fees on rice – i.e. policies which directly affect the ex-port landed 
price of imported rice.  Other policies which seek to affect domestic rice prices via expanding the 
supply of locally produced rice cannot hope to achieve anything so long as the economy remains 
open to imports which compete with domestic production.  Again, the analysis is so well known 
as to not require repeating here, but so long as the urban retail price is anchored by the world 
price then increased domestic production can only increase the proportion of local rice in the 
market, and not its price.  Local producers could certainly gain, but consumers would not. 
 
 
 
FOREIGN SUPPLIERS 
China                          Thailand 
Europe                        Vietnam 
 
IMPORTERS 
 
WHOLESALERS 
RETAILERS 
Urban Consumers Rural Consumers 
Figure 2: Marketing Channels for Imported Rice in Guinea Bissau 
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Figure 3:  Cashew/Rice Barter Terms of Trade in Guinea Bissau 
 
Source: WFP Synthesis of Rapid Food Security Assessment – Guinea Bissau June 2013 
 
 
C.  The non-existent middlemen – Implications of a dysfunctional marketing system  
 
 One of the key problems facing any effort to affect rural welfare via price incentives is 
the inability of the marketing system to actually transmit these prices to the household level.  On 
a basic physical level the truly awful condition of much of the secondary and tertiary rural road 
network makes it literally impossible to access large parts of the countryside through many 
months of the year.  Even in the dry season access is difficult and the physical transport of goods 
that would result in actual price changes doesn’t happen.  The PNIA (National Program for 
Agricultural Investment) concluded in 2010 emphasized the importance of this problem. 
 The role of cashew traders in bartering for product with rice rather than paying for it with 
cash plays a powerful role in perpetuating this situation.  Why would a trader looking to buy rice 
from farmers for resale in towns or other rural areas risk damage to his or her own transport 
equipment much less take the risk of an uncertain marketing margin in a situation where demand 
has already been satisfied by cashew traders bartering rice for raw nuts?  Furthermore, bartering 
for raw cashew with rice rather than paying for it means that the rural economy is to a large 
extent non-monetized – there is no scope for selling other items such as small consumer goods, 
agricultural inputs, etc. if the rural population have no cash to buy it with.  Furthermore, the 
natural market that would be supplied by local producers: the city of Bissau and provincial 
market towns – are precisely the areas where importers’ distributors are active in retail markets.   
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 All of this adds up to a situation in which even if policy makers could affect the price of 
rice in the city of Bissau or in provincial capitals, there can be no expectation that this would 
have any measurable effect on the incentives actually facing farmers.  Without a marketing 
system connecting them to the greater rice economy, each of them exists as an island, not just in 
terms of the rice market, but also in terms of the goods and services they might wish to buy if 
they could produce a rice surplus and monetize it through cash sale. 
 One other note is relevant to this discussion:  the term “poor governance” must be 
understood to apply not only to the central government in the capital city but also to extend more 
generally to encompass a frame of reference shared by everyone in a position of authority no 
matter how small or remote.  Potential marketing agents face not only adverse physical 
conditions and impoverished people in the countryside – they also face rapacious police and 
local authorities at every major intersection who exact their own “fees” before allowing passage.  
The extent of this is unknown but even a casual observer touring the countryside cannot help but 
note its pervasiveness. 
 
D. Welfare considerations 
 
 The most important fact about the welfare effects of rice price changes is that (unlike 
cashew) the country has significant numbers of poor who are net sellers while at the same time 
there are significant numbers of poor who are net consumers.  Clearly, any change in rice prices 
will have a short run benefit to one group but a loss to the other group.  In particular, any attempt 
to provide an immediate benefit to poor populations in rural areas might well center on either 
lowering the price of rice, or equivalently, increasing the quantity of rice to be bartered for a 
given amount of raw cashew. 
 
 Unfortunately, and inevitably, any attempt to do this (if it can even be successfully 
achieved) would have an adverse impact on all who grow rice and/who could potentially grow 
rice in the future.  In contrast, efforts to increase rice production via improved seed, better 
technology, improved roads, etc. would provide benefits to growers by lowering their costs of 
production while avoiding negative consequences for consumers.  At worst (from the consumer 
point of view) prices would remain linked to the international market via the effects of the large 
share of domestic consumption that is imported while the supply of the preferred domestic rice 
varieties is expanded. 
 
E. Graphical Analysis 
 To help clarify the discussion above, Figures 4, 5 and 6 show a graphical analysis of the 
rice market both in the short run and in the long run as well as the cashew market.   
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 Figure 4 shows the current situation in which rice is imported at two different prices set 
by the government based on their ability to alter taxes, fees, and also to impose requirements on 
rice importers.  At a high import price, domestic production is at point A while domestic 
consumption is at point B.  If, as proposed, the government were to impose a lower import price, 
then production would be lower at point C while consumption would rise to point D.  The 
important aspects to note are that while consumers would clearly gain (consuming more rice at a 
lower price) producers would lose, selling less rice and getting a lower price for it.   This analysis 
presumes that the government will forgo the various fees and taxes in order to make this lower 
price effective.   
 If the government does not absorb the cost of lowering the price of rice, and simply 
forces the price decrease on importers, the ramifications are rather more complex.  On the 
consumption side, if consumers also face the lower price then they will behave as above in 
Figure 4 and consume a greater quantity at a lower price.  However, the rice/cashew traders now 
face a situation in which de facto they are facing a higher price for cashew and will therefore act 
accordingly. 
 Figure  5 shows a depiction of the market for cashews in which the price of cashews is 
the barter terms of trade between rice and cashew.  The supply curve represents smallholder 
production of raw nuts while the demand curve, labelled ED, is the demand of exporters for these 
nuts.  Without any government intervention in the market we see an initial equilibrium at point A 
with (for the sake of argument) an initial barter terms of trade of 1 kg of rice for 1 kg of raw 
cashew. 
 If the government wants to enforce a higher price (say, 2kg of rice for 1 kg of cashew) it 
can do so in one of the two ways discussed above:  It can either absorb the cost itself by 
eliminating fees and taxes or it can force the rice/cashew traders to absorb the loss themselves.  
We can see clearly the difference between the two cases, first where the government absorbs the 
cost of cheaper rice and second when the lower price is instead forced on the traders who import 
rice to exchange it for cashew. 
 In the first case, the effect on the cashew market is quite simple – Offering more rice in 
exchange for cashew is in effect a higher price and should elicit greater production.  If the 
cashew exporters are bearing no extra costs, then their effective demand is shifted out by the 
amount of the subsidy to ED* and there is a new equilibrium production and export quantity at 
point C. 
 If, on the other hand, exporters are forced to pay the higher price themselves, it is 
equivalent to simply moving back up their demand curve and they will only want to purchase the 
amount indicated graphically as point B.   The difference between production and purchases,   B-
C, is excess supply that is not bought by traders.  This is clearly not a solution to the problem at 
hand, nor will it achieve the government’s goals:  The government will not have an expanded 
export volume which can be taxed, and growers will be reluctant to produce product that ends up 
unsold. 
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 Figure 6 shows a longer term view of the rice market in which investment in increased 
production (See alternatives discussed below in the next section) shifts the market supply curve 
to the right.  The graph as drawn shows supply expanded to the point where domestic production 
can satisfy all of domestic requirements at the lower of the two prices from Figure 4.  It is 
important to note that all during the traverse from the initial production point A (or C at the 
higher import price) to the production point D (or B at the higher price) internal prices are still 
governed by the world market price – the only adusting mechanism is the quantity imported 
which will depend on the difference between domestic supply and domestic demand at the world 
price.  Indeed, the world price would continue to be the operative domestic price even if the 
domestic supply expands sufficiently to generate exports to the right of point D (or B at the 
higher price) with the quantity still performing the role of adjustment, though via export 
quantities rather than imports. 
 
Figure 6 
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IV. Rice in Guinea Bissau in the Long Run 
 
A.  Does Guinea Bissau Have a Comparative Advantage in Rice Cultivation? 
 Guinea Bissau is essentially an estuarine country.  That is, a large percentage of the 
country is composed of areas which are well watered and through which various river deltas 
pass.  Traditionally, many of the ethnic groups comprising the majority of the population have 
been centered on rice cultivation, meaning that the human capital inherent in long term 
cultivation of a crop is well developed.  Rice is well known, and the “tricks of the trade” useful 
in cultivating it in traditional ways are well known.  This means that adoption of improved rice 
growing technologies should be relatively easier to promote than in areas where the crop is 
unknown. 
 Recent measures of comparative advantage were provided in the Diagnostic Trade 
Integration Study for Guinea Bissau completed in 2010.  While these estimates were of necessity 
based on extremely sparse data and only very limited surveys of production areas, the results 
were nevertheless strong enough to make very clear that Guinea Bissau has a strong comparative 
advantage in rice production.  Tables 6, 7 and 8 below, taken from Spencer and Djata 2008, 
shows that both lowland irrigated rice and traditional mangrove production systems have very 
markedly favorable Domestic Resource Cost estimates.  DRC’s are generally accepted as 
reasonable empirical indicators of comparative advantage, and we present here estimates both for 
DRC’s in Guinea Bissau and also for other countries in the region producing rice. 
 Realizing the potential indicated by the DRC calculations will require investment.  These 
are discussed below.  However, it is worth noting at the outset that though there are some short 
run interventions that would make a difference, there should be no illusions that results with a 
detectable macro impact could be expected within a short time span. 
 
B. Farm level interventions 
 
- Improved seed -  The first and most obvious intervention at the farm level is the introduction of 
improved varieties of seed adapted to local conditions.  This is a clear case of “low hanging 
fruit” in that Guinea Bissau has not had a significant agricultural research capacity for a period of 
decades.  This means that there are significant “off the shelf” improvements which could be 
readily adapted for introduction at the farm level.  While this is obviously not something that can 
be done from one year to the next, it is equally clear that the potential gains are very large.  The 
Africa Rice Center (formerly the West African Rice Development Association) is the most 
obvious point of contact for this and the relationship between them and the Guinean research 
establishment should be funded and promoted as a matter of the first priority. 
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Table 6: Estimated competiveness of existing rice production systems in a normal rainfall year with 2007 
rice prices 
INDICATORS Mangrove 
Swamp - N 
Mangrove 
Swamp - S 
Irrigated - 
Rainfed 
Irrigated – 
Pump 
Lowland Upland 
            
Farm/Plot Size (ha) 2.62 4.20 0.62 0.70 0.50 1.20 
Family Labor per ha (person days) 319 184 1,755 923 1,148 906 
Hired Labor per ha (person days) 74 29 29 29 29 23 
Paddy Yield (Kg per ha) 2,200 2,200 3,500 5,500 1,000 500 
            
Returns to Fam Lab per farm (CFA) 490,212 805,625 202,707 159,334 14,150 -2,392 
Returns to Fam Lab per ha (CFA) 187,104 191,815 326,946 227,620 28,301 -1,994 
Returns to Fam Lab per day (CFA) 587 1,045 186 247 25 -2 
            
Private Profits (CFA/kg) (PP)                189 249 204 205 104 76 
Social Profits (CFA/kg) (SP) 100 161 130 127 45 -47 
Private Cost Ratio (PCR) 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.24 0.30 0.37 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) 0.45 0.33 0.35 0.43 0.65 2.40 
            
Nominal Protection Coeff (NPC)            
- On tradable Outputs 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 
- On tradable Inputs 92.75% 87.34% 90.20% 75.18% 111.32% 84.06% 
            
Effective Protection Coeff (EPC) 129.16% 121.43% 121.72% 120.94% 118.55% 358.08% 
Notes:   
PP  = (Private Revenue - Overall Costs @ market prices)     
SP  = (Social Revenue - Overall Costs @ social prices)     
PCR  = (Non-Tradable Costs) / (Revenue - Tradable Costs) @ market prices   
DRC  = (Non-Tradable Costs) / (Revenue - Tradable Costs) @ social prices    
NPC  = (Private Revenue @ market prices) / (Social Revenue @ social prices)   
NPC  = (Tradable Costs @ market prices) / (Tradable Costs @ social prices)     
EPC  = (Private Revenue - Tradable Costs @ market prices) / (Soc Rev - Trad Costs @ social prices) 
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Table 7: Estimated competiveness of existing rice production systems in a bad rainfall year with 2007 
rice prices 
INDICATORS Mangrove 
Swamp - N 
Mangrove 
Swamp - S 
Irrigated - 
Rainfed 
Irrigated - 
Pump 
Lowland Upland 
             
Farm/Plot Size (ha) 2.62 4.20 0.62 0.70 0.50 1.20 
Family Labor per ha (person days) 319 184 1,755 923 1,148 906 
Hired Labor per ha (person days) 74 29 29 29 29 23 
Paddy Yield (Kg per ha) 1,800 1,800 3,000 5,500 800 400 
             
Returns to Fam Lab per farm (CFA) 333,012 604,025 165,507 159,334 2,150 -16,792 
Returns to Fam Lab per ha (CFA) 127,104 143,815 266,946 227,620 4,301 -13,994 
Returns to Fam Lab per day (CFA) 399 783 152 247 4 -15 
             
Private Profits (CFA/kg) (PP)                163 236 195 205 54 19 
Social Profits (CFA/kg) (SP) 72 147 119 127 -1 -115 
Private Cost Ratio (PCR) 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.24 0.46 0.71 
Domestic Resource Cost (DRC) 0.53 0.36 0.37 0.43 1.01 -2.36 
             
Nominal Protection Coeff (NPC)             
- On tradable Outputs 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 114.29% 
- On tradable Inputs 92.75% 87.34% 90.20% 75.18% 111.32% 84.06% 
             
Effective Protection Coeff (EPC) 135.76% 123.57% 123.43% 120.94% 122.62% -185.58% 
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Table 8: West African DRC Comparisons for Rice 
Country Rice 
System 
1978 1996 2003 2006 2007 
Cote D’Ivoire Irrigated 1.68 0.73    
Mali Irrigated 0.69 0.40    
Senegal Irrigated 1.66 1.12    
Sierra Leone Irrigated 0.83 0.70 0.20   
 Mangrove 0.84 0.42 0.68   
Guinea Bissau Mangrove     0.33 
 Irrigated     0.43 
 Lowland     0.65 
Liberia Lowland    0.30  
Sources: Spencer and Djata 2008 
 
- Infrastructure -  On-farm infrastructure is a key necessity for reestablishment of the domestic 
rice production capacity.  Dykes and sluicegates in the mangrove production system as well as 
improvements in irrigated perimeters already envisioned in existing project proposals can make a 
significant long term difference to Guinea Bissau’s food balance.  It is important to note that 
labor availability is a very important constraint to realization of this potential.  This is 
particularly so with respect to initial infrastructure works where project assistance can do much 
to help create adequate initial conditions for reactivation of production. 
 However, there are also heavy labor requirements in any of the favored rice production 
systems (mangrove, irrigated or lowland).  There has been a presumption in recent discussion 
that this labor requirement has been a zero-sum problem where farm labor cannot be allocated to 
rice because it has been allocated to more profitable cashew instead.  There are several important 
observations and caveats to this view of the problem: 
 
1.  No actual labor allocation research has established that this tradeoff really exists or is binding.  
Indeed, cashew is grown in many other SSA countries in conjunction with staple grains and 
nowhere else is this tradeoff seen to be a major problem.  Therefore, it is worth looking at the 
Guinea Bissau situation a bit more closely to determine what the real constraint is.   
27 
 
 It is important to recognize that there are actually two separate labor allocation issues.  
The first is the one-off  labor inputs needed to reconstruct the various dykes, sluiceways and 
other infrastructure needed for rice production.  Cashew similarly requires one-off labor inputs to 
establish plantings but in neither case do these inputs recur on an annual basis.  The second 
question is whether, once established, the two crops compete with each other for labor inputs.   
Rice is obviously a labor intensive crop as grown in traditional systems in Guinea Bissau and 
elsewhere while cashew is able to be produced with minimal labor inputs once trees are 
established.  Though some cultural practices are recommended (pruning, etc.) they are not 
required for low levels productivity.   
 
2. If, as seems reasonable, the primary goal of rural households is to ensure adequate food 
availability, then there really is no mystery why labor is allocated to cashew but not to rice: 
 - Cashew traders are a reliable source of rice supplies and demand raw cashew as   
 payment for it 
 - Rice production systems are in a state of disrepair; further, inputs (including seed) are 
 often unavailable and/or not available in a timely manner. 
 - Marketing systems for sale of on-farm surplus rice are rudimentary at  best and non-
 existent in many areas 
 
 All of these considerations make it clear that allocating labor to cashew and not to rice is 
very possibly a perfectly reasonable response to the high cost of reestablishing rice infrastructure 
coupled with the relative difficulty in marketing rice surpluses, together with the ready 
availability of a crop – cashew – which requires much less in terms of up-front inputs of labor 
and capital to establish viable production systems.   
 But this is not something that is immutable or incapable of being affected by policy and 
investment.  Indeed, the DRC calculations for rice discussed above, together with the obvious 
failures in infrastructure repair, input supply and marketing suggest that BOTH rice and cashew 
are potential money makers for rural households and that BOTH crops would be grown if there 
were reasonable conditions, both institutional and in terms of infrastructure for growing both of 
them. 
 However, at the present time the very high cost of reconstructing rice infrastructure 
prevents progress in this area.  The relatively low cost of propagating cashew presents no such 
problem, and the result is a heavy reliance on cashew production for rural incomes.  But it bears 
emphasizing that this is a situation that is capable of being overcome if the necessary one-off 
infrastructure investments can be made, perhaps with outside assistance. 
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C. Off farm interventions 
 
Rural Roads – Though Guinea Bissau has an adequate system of primary highways in many 
areas of the country it would be difficult to overemphasize the abysmal state of secondary and 
tertiary rural roads, or the importance of improving them.  Until this is accomplished it can be 
taken for granted that many areas in the southern “breadbasket” will remain isolated through the 
rainy season and accessed only with difficulty the rest of the year.  Isolation implies that they 
cannot respond to incentives and cannot integrate with the larger national economy. 
 
Marketing System -  As noted above, the non-existent rural marketing system prevents farmers 
from even seeing market signals, much less allowing them to respond to them.  Establishment of 
a rural marketing system has as a necessary condition the improvements in roads noted above, 
but also includes additional measures such as improved security in rural transport, better 
governance and control of petty corruption, improved credit availability and market 
infrastructure. 
 
 
D.  Services  
 
 As noted above, both research and input supply are areas where a concerted effort is 
needed to achieve minimum conditions for an output response in terms of marketed rice.  
Extension services to make this possible are currently near non-existent.  Given the difficulties in 
establishing government run extension services that can be relied on to adequately address these 
issues on a sustained basis, there is reason to promote the use of NGO’s with experience in 
performing these kinds of functions. 
 
 Indeed, given the fact that interventions and improvements are needed along virtually the 
entire supply chain, from infrastructure through seed, cultivation, and marketing, there is a 
likelihood that coordination of all of these efforts would require an implementing organization 
capable of encompassing them all since failure of any one of the links could (and in the past 
probably has) render the whole effort a failure.  Thus, a filiere approach as has been used with 
some success in other neighboring countries could be usefully considered here. 
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V.  What Does This Mean We Can or Should Do Now? 
 
A.  Short Run Options are Limited   
 
 The bottom line is that there is only so much policy can accomplish if the basic 
productive capacity is undeveloped – and that is exactly the situation we see in the rice sector in 
Guinea Bissau.  Though there is a strong comparative advantage and a long historical record of 
rice production, the current situation is one where much of the available resource base is unused 
and the potential that is clearly there is not readily accessible. 
 
Can manipulation of the retail price of rice alleviate poverty? 
 
 In terms of poverty alleviation there are no easy levers to pull when large segments of the 
poor population are: 
 
 - producers and so are made worse off when prices go down 
 - consumers and so are made worse off when prices go up 
 - trying to have it both ways (high prices for producers but low prices for consumers) is  
 prohibitively expensive in terms of the cost of such a subsidy 
 - Supply response in rice is inhibited both by the very high front-end cost of rehabilitating 
 rice infrastructure as well as the difficulties posed by the extremely low level of 
 development of the rural marketing system 
 
Short run price policy then becomes a political exercise in choosing which group to assist and 
which to damage.  No easy solution is available. 
 
Can the government even hope to successfully manipulate the rice price? 
 
 In short, no, and for two reasons: 
 
- Guinea Bissau is an open economy; the international price will continue to be 
the anchor for domestic rice prices as long as a large share of domestic 
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consumption is imported, and will continue to be the anchor if the country makes 
enough progress to become an exporter 
 
- The dysfunctional marketing system means that transmission of urban prices to 
rural areas cannot be taken for granted – Not only will producers fail to respond to 
incentives they do not even see, but they can do little to affect the domestic 
production/consumption balance if their potential surpluses cannot be marketed. 
 
 It might be tempting to say that a dysfunctional marketing system means that a lower rice 
price would benefit consumers while not materially affecting producers.  However, this is a very 
mistaken presumption for three reasons: 
 
- A subsidized rice price is a policy that has been tried in many places and times 
and which has well known problems associated with it.  Basically, there is no easy 
‘exit strategy’ from such a policy.  It is expensive and can come to dominate what 
balance can be achieved in government spending and revenue, and the political 
economy of the policy creates extremely powerful vested interests in its 
continuation.   
 
- To embark on such a path means giving up on the idea of promoting domestic 
production.  Improvements in seeds, infrastructure, etc. cannot hope to bear fruit 
if the rewards for making these improvements are limited ex ante through price 
policy. 
 
- Finally, the rice/cashew barter system that is common in Guinea Bissau today 
complicates such a policy immensely.  Trying to force an “improved” barter terms 
of trade on cashew traders and the rural economy amounts to little more than a 
roundabout tax on cashew trade and has the very real potential to damage the 
cashew trade without significantly helping improve rice availability. 
 
B.  What to Do? 
 
 The above difficulties in implementing a short run price policy capable of improving 
welfare in rural areas do not mean that there is nothing that can be done.  Rather, they mean that 
there are few easy or painless policies in a situation where there really is very little scope for 
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improvement without an improvement in basic productivity.  In short, there is no “free lunch”.    
Nevertheless, the strong comparative advantage that has been estimated in recent studies in 
Guinea Bissau and demonstrated over the course of history suggests that a longer term policy 
based on comparative advantage could well start to yield positive returns sooner than many 
might imagine.  Among the initiatives that could be considered are: 
 
 - Implement a project aimed at providing assistance for the investments needed to 
 rehabilitate rice infrastructure.  This is an area where outside help in the form of project 
 aid could make a real difference. 
- Push for a research/extension effort to promote improved rice varieties in both 
mangrove and lowland rice production systems.  Guinea Bissau has not had an 
effective capacity to take advantage of existing off-the-shelf seed improvements 
for a period of decades.  Current yields are well below those that have been 
demonstrated to be attainable in other African countries, particularly in mangrove 
production systems.  Given the fact that only local adaptation is required (that is, 
the basic research and breeding lines already exist) this can be expected to yield 
benefits as soon as it can be extended to farmers. 
- As discussed at length above, we cannot expect farmgate incentives to be 
effective until the dysfunctional marketing system is addressed;  It would make 
sense to start planning for an integrated research/extension/marketing 
development plan that could be implemented by NGO’s (to  avoid governance 
issues) 
-  Rural road improvement is a key element of any successful long term strategy.  
Though this is not an area where improvement can be expected overnight, and 
though road improvement is obviously quite expensive, there really is no way to 
avoid this issue.  Fortunately, Guinea Bissau is relatively flat and relatively small.  
Donor assistance could go far toward addressing these problems as they clearly 
have in the area of primary roads. 
- Efforts to monetize rural economy should be looked at carefully to alleviate 
short term crisis vulnerability.  One sure way to provide an incentive for 
marketing system development is to inject cash into the local economy.  In 
addition, the need to move beyond the current pure barter system where rice is 
exchanged for raw cashew is unavoidable.  As a purely short term crisis response, 
this has much to recommend it. 
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 For the foreseeable future the cashew price will remain the single most important policy 
lever for the rural economy in Guinea Bissau.  The higher it is the better for smallholders;  The 
more stable it is the less risk is transmitted to rural economy.  The fact that world cashew price 
fluctuations can severely impact rural areas in Guinea Bissau even to the point of provoking a 
crisis points to the need for diversification and development.  Unfortunately, there are no easy 
answers in terms of policy options for food crops to counterbalance these problems.  The 
experience of the past years shows clearly that there are major problems associated with attempts 
to manipulate and/or extract rents from the price at which cashews are traded.  Adding policies 
which attempt to manipulate the prices of still more crops will most probably simply add new 
problems to the situation without resolving any of the existing problems. 
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